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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Ahmed Bakran appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the 
United States Department of Homeland Security, the Director 
of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (the 
“USCIS”), and the Attorney General (“Defendants”) on 
Bakran’s statutory and constitutional challenges to the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 
109-248, § 402(a), 120 Stat. 587, 622-23 (2006) (the “AWA”), 
and related agency memoranda.   
 
 The AWA restricts the ability of a United States citizen 
convicted of a sex offense to sponsor an immediate relative’s 
immigration application.  Bakran claims that certain protocols 
used to enforce the AWA violate the Administrative 
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (the “APA”).  The 
protocols he challenges, however, simply guide the Secretary’s 
determination, and as we explain herein, we lack jurisdiction 
to review them.   
 
 Bakran also asserts that the AWA violates his right to 
marriage and is impermissibly retroactive.  The AWA does not 
infringe his marriage right but rather deprives him of an 
immigration benefit to which he has no constitutional right.  
Moreover, because the Act is aimed at providing prospective 
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protection, it is not impermissibly retroactive.  Therefore, we 
will vacate the District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment to Defendants on Bakran’s APA claims, and remand 
with directions to dismiss the APA claims for lack of 
jurisdiction, and affirm the District Court’s order denying relief 
on his constitutional and retroactivity challenges to the AWA. 
 
I 
 
A 
 
 Before 2006, the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. (the “INA”), provided that “[a]ny 
citizen of the United States claiming that an alien is entitled 
to . . . immediate relative status . . . may file a petition with the 
Attorney General for such classification.”  Id. 
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(i).  “Immediate relatives” generally include 
the spouses, children, and parents of a United States citizen.  
Id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).  Such relatives may enter the United 
States without regard to numerical limitations on immigration 
to the United States.  Id. § 1151(b).  In 2006, the AWA 
amended the INA so that a citizen “who has been convicted of 
a specified offense against a minor”1 may not file any petition 
on behalf of such relatives “unless the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, in the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable discretion, 
determines that the citizen poses no risk to the alien with 
                                                                
1 The AWA relies on 42 U.S.C. § 16911(7)(H)’s 
definition of a “specified offense against a minor,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(II), and 42 U.S.C. § 16911(7)(H) defines 
“a specified offense against a minor” to include “[c]riminal 
sexual conduct involving a minor, or the use of the Internet to 
facilitate or attempt such conduct,” id.   
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respect to whom a petition . . . is filed.”  Id. 
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I).  This provision is intended to 
effectuate the AWA’s stated purposes: “[t]o protect children 
from sexual exploitation and violent crime, [and] to prevent 
child abuse and child pornography.”  AWA, 120 Stat. at 587.   
 
 The USCIS issued two memoranda relevant to our 
consideration of the AWA.  The first, written by Michael 
Aytes, Associate Director of Domestic Operations of the 
USCIS (the “Aytes Memo”), sets forth the burden of proof a 
petitioner must meet to show that he or she poses no risk to his 
or her alien relative.  Specifically, the memo interpreted the 
“no risk” requirement to mean that to avoid denial of a petition, 
“a petitioner who has been convicted of a specified offense 
against a minor must submit evidence of rehabilitation and any 
other relevant evidence that clearly demonstrates, beyond any 
reasonable doubt, that he or she poses no risk to the safety and 
well-being of his or her intended beneficiar[ies].”  U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services, Guidance for 
Adjudication of Family-Based Petitions and I-129F Petition for 
Alien Fiancé(e) under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act of 2006 (Feb. 8, 2007), available at 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memor
anda/Static_Files_Memoranda/adamwalshact020807.pdf.  
The second, written by Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate 
Director of Domestic Operations of the USCIS (the “Neufeld 
Memo”), states that “given the nature and severity of many of 
the underlying offenses and the intent of the [AWA], approval 
recommendations should be rare.”  U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, Transmittal of SOP for Adjudication of 
Family-Based Petitions Under the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Sept. 24, 2008) (emphasis 
omitted).   
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B 
 
 Bakran is a United States citizen.  In 2004, he was 
convicted of aggravated indecent assault and unlawful contact 
with a minor.  He was sentenced to 11.5 to 23 months’ 
imprisonment, 10 years of probation, and lifetime sexual 
offender registration.  He was required to undergo a 
psychosexual evaluation and prohibited from any unsupervised 
contact with minors.   
 
 In 2012, Bakran married Zara Qazi, an adult Indian 
national.  He then sought lawful permanent resident status for 
her by filing a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, 8 C.F.R. 
§ 204.1(a)(1), and a Form I-485, Application for Permanent 
Residence, 8 C.F.R. 245.2(a)(3)(iii), with the USCIS.  In 
January 2014, he received a Request for Evidence/Notice of 
Intent to Deny his petition (the “Notice”), which noted that his 
2004 conviction prevented him from designating his wife as 
his immediate relative for the purposes of exempting her 
Application for Permanent Residence from the worldwide 
levels of numerical limitations pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) unless he could show he posed no risk to 
her.  Bakran had already submitted materials regarding his 
conviction with his initial application, and he filed additional 
documents in response to the Notice.  The USCIS determined 
that Bakran had committed a “specified offense against a 
minor” under the AWA, and denied his application.   
 
 Bakran filed suit in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Defendants based 
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on the denial of his petition.  He alleged the denial violated the 
Constitution and APA.  Defendants moved to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that 
the District Court lacked jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s 
determination of Bakran’s petition.  The District Court denied 
the motion, reasoning that Bakran “does not question the 
Secretary’s . . . ‘unreviewable discretion’” concerning the 
decision about him.  Bakran v. Johnson, CIV. A. No. 15-127, 
2015 WL 3631746, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 11, 2015).  Instead, 
according to the District Court, Bakran challenges the 
Secretary’s “non-discretionary threshold determination” and 
argues that his inability to “file an I-130 petition on his wife’s 
behalf . . . violates his constitutional rights.”  Id.  The District 
Court held that Bakran’s APA challenge did not seek review 
“of the discretionary ‘no risk’ assessment or even the substance 
of the rules adopted regarding that assessment.”  Id.  The Court 
therefore concluded that it had jurisdiction to review all of 
Bakran’s claims. 
 
 Defendants then moved for summary judgment, which 
the District Court granted.  On the APA claims, the Court ruled 
that (1) the agency’s adoption of a beyond-any-reasonable-
doubt standard was not ultra vires2 under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984), Bakran v. Johnson, 192 F. Supp. 3d 585, 601 (E.D. 
                                                                
2 Bakran’s ultra vires claim, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(C), alleges that the USCIS took action “in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right . . . .”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C); see also Ultra 
Vires, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (stating that 
“ultra vires” means “[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of 
power allowed or granted . . . by law”). 
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Pa. 2016); (2) the assessment of risk after filing and 
presumption of denial, per the Neufeld Memo, were not 
arbitrary and capricious, id. at 598-99; and (3) the Aytes and 
Neufeld Memos qualify as “interpretive rules” that do not 
require notice-and-comment rule-making,” id. at 599-600.  On 
the constitutional claims, the Court concluded that the AWA 
was neither punitive nor impermissibly retroactive, id. at 594-
95, and Bakran’s due process claim failed because the AWA 
does not infringe his fundamental constitutional right to marry, 
id. at 595-97.  Bakran appeals.   
 
II3 
 
A 
 
                                                                
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  We apply the same 
standard as the District Court, viewing facts and making all 
reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor.  Hugh v. 
Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 
2005).  Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
Here, there are no disputed facts.  The moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails 
to make “a sufficient showing on an essential element of her 
case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.”  
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
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 We first address whether we have subject matter 
jurisdiction over Bakran’s claim that the Secretary violated the 
APA by imposing a beyond-any-reasonable-doubt burden of 
proof and a presumption of denial of AWA applications, as 
expressed in the Aytes and Neufeld Memos.   
 
 District courts have jurisdiction to review agency action 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “subject only to preclusion-of-review 
statutes created or retained by Congress.”  Chehazeh v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 666 F.3d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)).  The APA bars 
judicial review where “statutes preclude judicial review” or 
“agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.”  
5 U.S.C. § 701(a).  The INA provides that “no court shall have 
jurisdiction to review . . . any . . . decision or action of . . . the 
Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is 
specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of . . . the 
Secretary of Homeland Security.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).  The INA’s “jurisdiction–stripping 
language . . . applies not to all decisions the [Secretary] is 
entitled to make, but to a narrower category of decisions where 
Congress has taken the additional step to specify that the sole 
authority for the action is in the [Secretary]’s discretion.”  
Alaka v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 456 F.3d 88, 95 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Of relevance here, the AWA states that a citizen, such as 
Bakran, convicted of a specified offense may not file a petition 
for immediate relative status “unless the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable 
discretion, determines that the citizen poses no risk to the alien 
with respect to whom a petition . . . is filed.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I).  The AWA therefore precludes 
judicial review of the Secretary’s no-risk determination 
concerning a specific citizen.   
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 The issue here is whether the two procedures set forth 
in the Aytes and Neufeld Memos are themselves reviewable.  
Bakran argues that the Secretary, through the USCIS, acted 
ultra vires in imposing upon citizen petitioners a requirement 
that they prove beyond any reasonable doubt that they pose no 
risk to the alien beneficiary and by informing field officers that 
granting permission to file petitions on the beneficiaries’ 
behalf should be rare.4  Our authority to review these claims 
depends on whether the standard of proof and rareness 
directive are part of the Secretary’s statutorily-granted 
unreviewable discretion.  To make this decision, we examine 
the statute’s language to identify the boundaries of the 
discretion granted to the agency.   
 
 The INA and Alaka instruct that courts lack jurisdiction 
to review decisions that are within the Secretary’s sole 
discretion.  Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Alaka, 456 F.3d at 95.  The 
AWA states that the Secretary has sole and unreviewable 
discretion when it “determines” that a citizen petitioner poses 
no risk to the alien for whom the petition is filed.  The choice 
of the word “determines” frames the matters within this 
discretion.  The word “determine” means “to fix conclusively 
or authoritatively” as well as “to come to a decision concerning 
as the result of investigation or reasoning.”  Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary 616 (1993).  Congress’s use of 
the word “determines” therefore grants the Secretary 
unreviewable discretion in both concluding that a petitioner 
poses no risk and the process by which the Secretary reaches 
this decision.  Thus, the exercise of discretion includes 
                                                                
4 Bakran raised arbitrary-and-capricious claims in his 
complaint but abandons those claims on appeal.   
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deciding the type of proof required, the evidentiary standard a 
petitioner must satisfy, and whether the petitioner’s evidence 
meets that standard.  Because these considerations are 
inextricably intertwined with how and whether to exercise that 
discretion, and § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) provides that “no court shall 
have jurisdiction to review . . . any . . . decision or action 
of . . . the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for 
which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion 
of . . . the Secretary of Homeland Security,” we are precluded 
from reviewing both the decision and process for reaching it.  
See Gebhardt v. Nielsen, 879 F.3d 980, 984-85, 987 (9th Cir. 
2018) (holding that courts lack jurisdiction to review 
challenges to the beyond-any-reasonable-doubt standard and 
the requirement of a no-risk determination, among other 
claims; “each one challenges how the Secretary exercises—or 
has exercised—his or her ‘sole and unreviewable discretion’ to 
adjudicate I-130 petitions” (emphasis in original)); Roland v. 
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 850 F.3d 625, 630 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (concluding that courts lack jurisdiction to review 
petitioner’s APA challenge based in part on that Circuit’s 
precedent that “relevant determinations ‘cannot be divorced 
from the denial [of an application to adjust status] itself’” 
(quoting Lee v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 592 
F.3d 612, 620 (4th Cir. 2010))); Bremer v. Johnson, 834 F.3d 
925, 930-31 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that courts lack 
jurisdiction over an APA claim that the USCIS exceeded its 
statutory authority by requiring applicants to prove beyond any 
reasonable doubt that they pose no risk to beneficiaries because 
the claim “challenge[d] how the Secretary, acting through the 
USCIS, has exercised his discretion to make a no-risk 
determination under the [AWA]”); Struniak v. Lynch, 159 F. 
Supp. 3d 643, 654 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding that 
“§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips courts of jurisdiction to review both 
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the ultimate decision that is discretionary and the steps that are 
a necessary and ancillary part of reaching the ultimate 
decision”); cf. Jilin Pharm. USA v. Chertoff, 447 F.3d 196, 204 
(3d Cir. 2006) (observing that an agency’s determination of 
whether good cause to revoke a visa exists in a particular case 
also includes “what constitutes such cause in the first place,” 
and that the good cause determination is within the agency’s 
unreviewable discretion (citation and internal quotation mark 
omitted)). 
 
 For these reasons, federal courts lack jurisdiction to 
review the burden of proof and rareness directives that guide 
the Secretary’s determination concerning whether a petitioning 
sex offender poses no risk to the beneficiary of his or her 
petition.5  Thus, the District Court should have dismissed 
                                                                
5 Our ruling here does not render each and every one of 
the Secretary’s actions immune from review.  We are 
cognizant that there is a “strong presumption in favor of 
judicial review of administrative action.”  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 
U.S. 289, 298 (2001); see also, e.g., Hanna v. Phila. Asbestos 
Co., 743 F.2d 996, 999 (3d Cir. 1984) (“[A] statute should not 
be interpreted as precluding judicial review absent clear 
evidence of Congressional intent.” (citing Johnson v. Robison, 
415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974))).  As a result, we are not holding 
that a court lacks jurisdiction to review an action beyond the 
authority Congress granted to the agency, which the 
Government concedes would be reviewable, Oral Arg. at 
27:14-27:25, 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/16-
3440Bakranv.SecretaryUnitedStatesDepartmentofHomelandS
ecurity.mp3, or an action that would violate the Constitution, 
see, e.g., Bartlett v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 695, 698-99, 703-07 
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Bakran’s APA claims, and we will therefore vacate the order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on 
Bakran’s APA claims and remand with a directive that the 
District Court dismiss these claims.  
 
B 
 
1 
 
 Bakran also makes two challenges to the AWA: the 
AWA violates his substantive due process right to marry,6 and 
the AWA is impermissibly retroactive.  Unlike Bakran’s APA 
challenges to the Secretary’s actions, we have jurisdiction to 
review these challenges to the statute.  See Johnson v. Robison, 
415 U.S. 361, 367 (1974); Kreschollek v. S. Stevedoring Co., 
78 F.3d 868, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1996).  
  
2 
 
 Bakran asserts that by barring him from petitioning to 
adjust his foreign spouse’s immigration status, the AWA 
infringes his right to marry because it deprives him of benefits 
                                                                
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (construing § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) to permit 
judicial review of constitutional claims because concluding 
that Article III courts lack jurisdiction to do so would raise 
constitutional concerns since Congress would be allowed to 
legislate and judge the constitutionality of its actions).  Rather, 
we hold here only that we lack jurisdiction to review Bakran’s 
claims pertaining to the Aytes and Neufeld Memos. 
6 Bakran’s complaint also alleged a violation of his 
procedural due process rights, but he has not pursued that claim 
on appeal. 
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flowing from his marriage, including the ability to live with his 
spouse in the United States.  The due process guarantees of the 
Fifth Amendment “include a substantive component, which 
forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ 
liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, 
unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.”  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-
02 (1993) (emphasis omitted).  The right to marry is one such 
fundamental right.  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2604 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).   
 
 The AWA’s restriction on a convicted sex offender’s 
ability to sponsor his spouse’s immigration petition does not 
infringe the fundamental right to marry.  Citizens like Bakran 
are not barred from marrying, and in fact Bakran has married.  
Recognizing this, Bakran asserts that the AWA interferes with 
his ability to live in the United States with his foreign spouse.  
Thus, he asserts that he has a constitutional right to sponsor his 
foreign spouse’s immigration application.  His assertion fails 
for several reasons.   
 
 First, cognizant of Congress’s plenary authority to set 
the conditions for an alien’s entry into the United States, see, 
e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 
537, 543 (1950), no court has recognized that a citizen spouse 
has a constitutional right to have his or her alien spouse reside 
in the United States, see Gebhardt, 879 F.3d at 988 (“Boiled 
down, Plaintiff’s theory is that he has a fundamental right to 
reside in the United States with his non-citizen [spouse].  But 
that theory runs headlong into Congress’ plenary power over 
immigration.”); Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 496 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that “[t]he Constitution does not recognize 
the right of a citizen spouse to have his or her alien spouse 
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remain in the country” (alteration in original ) (quoting 
Almario v. Att’y Gen., 872 F.2d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1989))); 
Burrafato v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 523 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 
1975) (holding that a citizen spouse has no constitutional right 
to seek to bar the deportation of an alien spouse); Silverman v. 
Rogers, 437 F.2d 102, 107 (1st Cir. 1970) (same); Swartz v. 
Rogers, 254 F.2d 338, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (same); cf. 
Moralez-Izquierdo v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 600 F.3d 1076, 
1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the denial of adjustment 
of status did not violate any of the petitioner’s or his family’s 
substantive rights, where the petitioner argued that the denial 
violated their right to live together as a family in the United 
States), abrogated in part on other grounds by Garfias-
Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).7 
                                                                
7 Bakran argues that the dissent in Kerry v. Din, 135 S. 
Ct. 2128 (2015), along with Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the 
majority in Obergefell, support his view that his due process 
rights have been infringed.  Bakran is incorrect.  First, although 
Obergefell reaffirmed the fundamental right to marry, see 135 
S. Ct. at 2598-2605, 2608, that case does not stand for the 
proposition that Bakran has a fundamental right to petition for 
the lawful permanent resident status in the United States for his 
alien wife.  Second, in Din, the Supreme Court focused on 
procedural rather than substantive due process rights, and 
Bakran has not pursued his procedural due process claim on 
appeal.  See 135 S. Ct. at 2138 (plurality of Scalia, J., joined 
by Roberts and Thomas, JJ.) (holding that the denial of the visa 
application of the petitioner’s husband did not deprive her of 
any life, liberty, or property, so she was not entitled to 
constitutional due process protections); id. at 2139 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring, joined by Alito, J.) (noting that even assuming 
Din had a protected liberty interest, the notice she received 
16 
 
 Second, Bakran’s sex offense conviction impacts his 
access to an immigration benefit, which is not limited to 
married persons.  Put differently, unlike the benefits identified 
in Obergefell that are granted only to married couples, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2599-2601, the availability of this immigration benefit is 
not exclusively contingent on marriage because parents and 
children may seek the benefit.  Thus, this immigration benefit 
does not fall within the types of marriage benefits that the 
Supreme Court identified that serve the goals marriage 
advances.   
 
 Third, Bakran is denied access to this immigration 
benefit because of his prior sex conviction.  Limiting the rights 
of convicted felons has historical roots.  See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. 
§ 504(a) (ineligibility to serve in the armed forces, unless an 
exception is made); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (restriction on 
possession of a firearm); 21 U.S.C. § 862 (providing that 
individuals convicted of drug offenses may be denied federal 
benefits including grants, contracts, loans, professional 
licenses, and commercial licenses); 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) 
(restriction on right to serve on federal grand and petit juries 
unless the individual’s civil rights have been restored); 
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 38 (2002) (plurality opinion) 
(“[L]awful conviction and incarceration necessarily place 
limitations on the exercise of a defendant’s privilege against 
self-incrimination.”); Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 418-23 
(1981) (upholding restrictions on a felon’s constitutionally 
                                                                
satisfied due process requirements); id. at 2142 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ.) 
(concluding that the petitioner had a liberty interest in living 
with her husband in the United States “to which the Due 
Process Clause grants procedural protection”). 
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protected right to travel); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 
56 (1974) (upholding a state law that disenfranchised 
convicted felons); see also, e.g., A.A. ex rel. M.M. v. New 
Jersey, 341 F.3d 206, 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting previous, 
unsuccessful constitutional challenges to New Jersey’s 
Megan’s Law and holding that any privacy interest sex 
offenders may have in their home addresses was substantially 
outweighed by the state’s interest in protecting the public).  
Thus, once one sustains a felony conviction, consequences 
follow, including the loss of certain rights and government 
benefits.  Bakran’s loss of his ability to sponsor his spouse may 
impede his ability to assist her to adjust her status, but this 
impediment is no more burdensome than other limitations 
placed on convicted felons’ constitutional rights. 
 
 In short, while the AWA restricts Bakran’s access to 
certain immigration benefits because of his prior conviction, it 
does not deprive Bakran of his fundamental right to marry or a 
benefit uniquely available to married persons.  As a result, the 
District Court correctly entered judgment in favor of 
Defendants on this claim.   
 
3 
 
 Bakran’s second argument attacking the AWA also 
lacks merit.  In his complaint, Bakran asserted that the AWA 
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, U.S. Const. art. I § 9, cl. 3, 
which applies only to penal legislation that applies 
retroactively, Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 
n.19 (1994); Myrie v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Corrs., 267 F.3d 
251, 255 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 
24, 29 (1981).  Bakran’s abandonment of his Ex Post Facto 
claim on appeal reflects his acknowledgment that the AWA is 
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not penal.8  Relying on the general principle of anti-
retroactivity, and statutory construction, he claims that the 
AWA is impermissibly retroactive because it attaches new 
legal consequences to his prior conviction. 
 
 When examining retroactivity, we ask “whether 
Congress has expressly provided that the statute should be 
retroactive.”  Atkinson v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 479 F.3d 222, 
226 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280).  “If the 
answer is yes, our inquiry is over.”  Id.  If the statute does not 
have any express statement of retroactivity, then we must 
determine whether “normal rules of statutory construction 
unequivocally remove the possibility of retroactivity.”  Id. 
(emphasis omitted).  If there is no express command or intent 
to apply the statute only prospectively, then we must determine 
whether applying the statute to events predating its enactment 
would have a retroactive effect.  Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280; 
Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 226.  An act has retroactive effect if it 
“takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing 
laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or 
attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or 
considerations already past.”  Atkinson, 479 F.3d at 227 
(quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001)).  If the 
                                                                
8 The AWA’s stated purpose is to protect children and 
the public at large from sex offenders, 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901, 
16935(3), and the Supreme Court has said that “restrictive 
measures on sex offenders adjudged to be dangerous is ‘a 
legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been 
historically so regarded,’” Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 93 
(2003) (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 
(1997)); accord Bremer, 834 F.3d at 932.  Thus, the AWA is 
not penal. 
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statute has a retroactive effect, “we employ the strong 
presumption against applying such a statute retroactively.”  Id. 
at 226 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 The AWA neither expressly provides that it should 
apply retroactively nor unequivocally removes the possibility 
of it being applied retroactively.  It does, however, suggest that 
Congress intended for past events to impact a citizen’s ability 
to invoke benefits under the INA.  For instance, 
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) states that the provision allowing 
citizens to file family-based petitions does not apply to a 
citizen “who has been convicted of a specified offense against 
a minor, unless the Secretary of Homeland Security, in the 
Secretary’s sole and unreviewable discretion, determines that 
the citizen poses no risk to the alien with respect to whom a 
petition . . . is filed.”  8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I).  The 
use of “has been” suggests that the AWA applies to persons 
who were convicted before its enactment.  Thus, Congress 
appears to have intended for the Secretary to consider events 
that predate the statute.   
 
 The statute’s focus, however, is on “dangers that arise 
postenactment.”  Vartelas v. Holder, 566 U.S. 257, 271 n.7 
(2012).  “[S]pecifically,” the AWA addresses “the dangers that 
convicted sex offenders may pose to new immigrants.”  
Bremer, 834 F.3d at 932; see also, e.g., Gebhardt, 879 F.3d at 
986 (concluding that Congress enacted the AWA “[t]o protect 
children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent 
child abuse and child pornography, to promote Internet safety, 
and to honor the memory of . . . child crime victims” (quoting 
AWA, 120 Stat. at 587) (emphasis omitted); “[t]o that end, the 
entire scheme focuses on prevention—not punishment”); 
Suhail v. U.S. Att’y Gen., No. 15-cv-12595, 2015 WL 
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7016340, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2015) (concluding that 
application of the AWA was “a civil matter to prevent future 
additional sex offenses against children”); Matter of Jackson, 
26 I. & N. Dec. 314, 318 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Because the Adam 
Walsh Act addresses the potential for future harm posed by 
such sexual predators to the beneficiaries of family-based visa 
petitions, we find that the application of its provisions to 
convictions that occurred before its enactment does not have 
an impermissible retroactive effect.”).  The AWA therefore 
resembles, for example, “laws prohibiting persons convicted of 
a sex crime against a victim under 16 years of age from 
working in jobs involving frequent contact with minors” in that 
the wrongful activity targeted by the statute is the potential 
future conduct rather than the past offense.  Vartelas, 566 U.S. 
at 271 n.7.  The no-risk provision bolsters the conclusion that 
the statute’s purpose is preventing post-enactment danger as 
opposed to attaching a new disability.  For these reasons, the 
AWA “do[es] not operate retroactively.”  Id.  Therefore, the 
District Court correctly rejected Bakran’s retroactivity 
argument. 
 
III 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, with 
respect to Bakran’s constitutional claims, and we will vacate in 
part, with respect to his APA claims, and remand with 
directions to dismiss the APA claims.   
